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INTRODUCTION  
With its intrinsic urgency and often emotional content, real-time news coverage can 
compress the amount of time governments have for responding to a sudden crisis or to 
new developments in a foreign policy matter. The effects of this compression are 
debatable. One school of thought holds that news coverage generally can drive policy-
making. On the other hand, the argument can be made that the impact of news coverage 
is overrated, and that competent policy makers resist news-generated pressures.  
The effects of live news coverage are related to its content. Live reporting - on television, 
radio, and, increasingly, the Internet - may lack context, detail and even accuracy. 
Nevertheless, such coverage, particularly when it includes graphic detail and emotive 
reporting, can capture the public's attention and affect public opinion.  
This article examines several instances in which coverage has affected policy and 
discusses issues that policy makers should consider as real-time coverage becomes more 
common. It also addresses the obligations of news organizations that provide this 
coverage. Important systemic issues are at stake in the evolving interplay between press 
and policy. George F. Kennan, after watching live coverage of American troops going 
ashore in Somalia in 1993, wrote, "If American policy from here on out, particularly 
policy involving the uses of our armed forces abroad, is to be controlled by popular 
emotional impulses, and particularly ones provoked by the commercial television 
industry, then there is no place not only for myself, but for what have traditionally been 
regarded as the responsible deliberative organs of our government."1  
Beyond the dynamic tension between the news business and the business of government, 
a principal thesis of this article is that the impact of real-time coverage is inversely 
proportional to the solidity of government policy. News coverage (real-time or otherwise) 
has greater effect on poorly formed, overly pliable policy and policy makers. It has less 
influence on well-designed, thoroughly thought-through policy and those who are 
responsible for it. That should not be surprising, but while some policy makers operate 
accordingly, others do not.  
Prime Time War  
As seen through the television camera's night-vision lens, downtown Baghdad was 
drenched in a surreal yellow-green glow. For much of the time all was still, with an 
automobile's headlights occasionally sliding across the screen. Periodically, the night 
became alive with flashes: small ones dotting the sky; then a larger one - like a torch - 
moving steadily across the horizon; then a huge burst of light. The shells and bombs 
crackled and boomed. On-scene reporters gasped and tried to steady their voices. It was 
quite a show. 
This was mid-December 1998, as the United States and Great Britain launched four days 
of air strikes against Iraq. Live coverage of combat, such a novelty during the 1991 Gulf 
War, now was smoothly integrated into the flow of television news. 
In this instance, the attack on Iraq provided extra drama as counterpoint to impeachment 
proceedings under way in the US House of Representatives. On Saturday, 19 December 
as debate proceeded prior to the impeachment vote, the television audience could watch 
both the House chamber and Baghdad on split screen. It was an impressive, if not 
particularly meaningful, electronic collage.  
For its part, the Clinton administration seemed to have adjusted well to the requisites of 
prime time war. White House press secretary Joe Lockhart timed his official 
announcement about the air strikes to coincide with network television reports from 
Baghdad about the attack. The Pentagon casually let journalists know when a wave of 
missiles was launched, despite the fact that the audience for CNN and other networks 
quite likely included members of Saddam Hussein's government.  
Hanging over the bombing was a political question: Did President Clinton order the 
attack as a way to rally public support and impede the impeachment process? Did the 
White House hope that a dose of "living-room war" - engrossing but safely remote 
violence - would give a final boost to anti-impeachment poll numbers? The 
administration forcefully denied all such allegations but could not dispel them. This is 
one of the most recent cases illustrating a link between news coverage and public policy. 
Although it is impossible to determine Clinton's true intent concerning the timing of the 
attacks and impeachment, any president knows that televised images of war - particularly 
when they are part of real-time coverage - will capture the public's attention and may well 
stimulate a rally 'round the flag response.  
As the 1991 Gulf War illustrated, live coverage has complex ramifications for policy 
makers and journalists. It removes the cushion of time and with it considerable flexibility. 
When the public is seeing events as they happen, policy makers may be pressed to 
respond rapidly. When news organizations provide real-time coverage, their journalists 
must similarly keep pace with the action. Time for reflection - a precious commodity in 
both government and the news business - may be squeezed to the point of nonexistence.  
The beginning of the Gulf War had been preceded by television-influenced diplomacy, 
with speed a principal characteristic of the coverage and with CNN, eager to be taken 
seriously, a major player. Even when direct communication between Iraqi and American 
officials broke down, CNN was available as a de facto diplomatic channel. 
Spokespersons for each side could talk to CNN and be relatively certain that their 
counterparts would get the message. On the day before the bombing began, CNN 
chairman Ted Turner stressed the network's importance in a telephone call to his 
Baghdad producer, Robert Wiener. "We're a global network," said Turner. "If there's a 
chance for peace . . . it might come through us. Hell, both sides aren't talking to each 
other, but they're talking to CNN. We have a major responsibility."2
Not only politicians were watching CNN. When CNN anchor Bernard Shaw reported 
from Baghdad, shortly before the 1991 air war began, that an Iraqi official had expressed 
a willingness to discuss all issues, the American stock market soared. This response was 
in part a product of the ripple effect a story can have. A writer for the Dow Jones wire 
ascribed more importance to the CNN report than was appropriate and the story was 
moved as a bulletin. The combination of the CNN story and the Dow Jones report gave 
the market a shove. Shaw immediately went back on the air to clarify his original story, 
and angrily told his producer, "I can't be responsible for what people want to believe."3
In this instance, Bush administration policy makers reacted far more cautiously to the 
report than some members of the public did. Nevertheless, what proved to be a relatively 
inconsequential story roiled the waters. For the Dow Jones wire and for stock market 
traders, speed was all important in responding to the CNN story. Reflection - asking, 
"What does this really mean?" - could be set aside for later. 
The Iraqis also were paying attention to CNN. When the network broadcast a story from 
Atlanta referring to Iraq's National Assembly as "Saddam Hussein's rubber-stamp 
parliament," an Iraqi information officer called the CNN Baghdad producer to protest. 
The producer immediately relayed the complaint to Atlanta (where the editor agreed that 
the "rubber-stamp" designation was a clichŽ, even if accurate).4  
Officials in Washington used television to send messages to Baghdad. After the war, 
Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, who conducted Pentagon news briefings, said: "Every 
single time I mentioned the use of chemical weapons in a press briefing, I would look 
into the camera and say, 'You must understand, any commander who uses chemical 
weapons is going to be held accountable for his actions.' I knew they watched CNN in 
Iraq, and I wanted those guys to hear that."5 In such cases, technology was helping to 
shape the content and impact of the message. A few years before, using the news media 
as a diplomatic messenger might have meant leaking information to the New York Times 
and then gauging reaction as policy makers mulled over the story that ran the next day. 
Now, hours have become minutes, and policy makers may find themselves electronically 
face to face. This process has been likened to "a 'diplomatic ping-pong match,' with 
adversaries and allies rapidly serving and returning messages" through CNN or other 
news organizations.6  
Once the air war began in January 1991, CNN brought its viewers extensive live 
coverage from what CNN reporter John Holliman said was "like the center of hell."7 The 
upstart network dominated early coverage of the war partly because its planners had 
provided its Baghdad staff with the technical tools needed to circumvent Iraqi-controlled 
equipment. CNN also may have received preferential treatment because the Iraqi 
government wanted to have a way to get its own messages to the rest of the world 
quickly. This use of media as messenger is an important element in the larger relationship 
between press and government. For the first two weeks of the war, CNN broadcast its 
audio live. The Iraqis had allowed CNN to use a "four-wire" satellite telephone that did 
not depend on local switching connections. This enabled CNN's Baghdad crew to stay on 
the air for 16 hours when the bombing began. Their competitors were cut off after just a 
few minutes. 
At the end of January, with the permission of Saddam Hussein's government, CNN began 
using its own flyaway (portable by truck) satellite uplink, allowing it to broadcast live 
pictures. Local American affiliates of the big three networks frequently switched over to 
CNN when their own networks lagged. As the supplier of news to more than 100 
countries, CNN was the world's primary source of televised war coverage.  
In striking contrast to the Vietnam War, the Gulf War saw significant censorship 
measures imposed by the American government. This was due largely to the belief within 
the Bush administration that news coverage of the fighting in Vietnam had undermined 
Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, a debatable point and more about 
political than security matters. But the censorship also was seen as necessary at the White 
House and Pentagon because of the new realities of live coverage. It would be 
intolerable, for example, for a correspondent to do a live report with a column of 
American tanks in the background and say, "The push toward Kuwait has just begun." 
Given the broad audience, including Iraqi officials, for live television news, this kind of 
report could pose a genuine threat to the security of American forces. News organizations 
could argue that they were perfectly capable of self-censorship in such instances, but the 
Bush administration was determined to set the rules. 
Some of the coverage was ragged enough to illustrate the administration's point. Despite 
the censorship, reporters still found plenty to discuss, but sometimes the quest for drama 
overwhelmed thoughtful news judgment, and the emphasis on speed superseded fact 
checking. Lawrence Grossman, a former president of NBC News, said that television 
viewers experienced "the illusion of news" because "the on-the-scene cameras and live 
satellite pictures at times served to mask reality rather than shed light on what was 
happening." He added, "Rumors, gossip, speculation, hearsay and unchecked claims were 
televised live, without verification, without sources, without editing, while we watched 
newsmen scrambling for gas masks and reacting to missile alerts."8 Journalist Johanna 
Neuman wrote that "viewers could not so much see war as they could observe news-
gathering in the war zone."9  
The potential effect of journalism makes its flaws more important. Even Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney said that in the days preceding the war he was getting much of his 
information about goings on in the Gulf region from CNN. Reportorial lapses in such 
circumstances thus are not merely fuel for future academic debates about journalistic 
responsibility; they can have immediate impact if policy makers rely on them. For their 
part, the policy makers should not overly depend on news accounts without their being 
corroborated. For example, soon after the air war began, CNN reported that the Iraqi Air 
Force and the Republican Guard (reputedly the best Iraqi troops) had been "decimated" 
and their missile launchers knocked out. It simply was not so. General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, commander of allied forces, later said that he had "turned the TV off in the 
headquarters very early on because the reporting was so inaccurate I did not want my 
people to get confused."10
Live coverage of Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia sometimes 
provided examples of speed-induced problems. Lawrence Grossman said of this: "In their 
impatience to get on the air live rather than wait to find out what was going on, television 
reporters wondered aloud on-screen about what they were seeing and what was 
happening. No longer did they perform as reporters trying to filter out true information 
from false. Instead, they were merely sideline observers, as ill-informed as the rest of us. 
Was it the sound of 'thunder' or a 'lethal rocket attack' outside? Was it the odor of 'nerve 
gas' or 'conventional explosives' that was seeping into the TV studio in Tel Aviv? (It 
turned out to be bus exhaust.)"11
The inconsistent mix of timely, accurate journalism and hurried, misleading reports is 
something that policy makers must factor into their calculations about the situation being 
covered and about public opinion. As a news story, an event such as the Gulf War will 
attract a massive audience - much the same audience that a president needs to be 
supportive of his policy. This means that government officials will try to direct and 
sometimes correct coverage as the need arises, promoting their version of events with the 
same emphasis on speed that drives electronic journalism. For one thing, government can 
take advantage of the expanding appetite for information that expanding coverage 
produces. Journalist Warren Strobel has noted that "journalists rely overwhelmingly on 
official sources for reporting the news, and this reliance is even greater with regard to 
national security matters."12 A good example of this during the Gulf War was networks', 
especially CNN's, reliance on Pentagon briefings. Assertions by military officials may or 
may not have been totally reliable, but at least they filled air time. Shanto Iyengar and 
Adam Simon found that "in our analysis of network news reports on the Gulf, more than 
50 percent of all reports examined emanated directly from official spokespersons."13 
With more real-time pressure on news organizations, such reliance is likely to continue.  
One danger of live coverage is the tendency to put more value on quantity and 
immediacy than on quality. Patrick O'Heffernan observed that the Pentagon designed a 
successful strategy to feed news organizations' appetites for more and more material. The 
menu included video of smart-bomb strikes and Patriot missiles, and details - no matter 
how trivial - about the troops, their equipment, their home towns, and on and on. He 
noted that "media-sophisticated elites can redirect media attention away from 
unpleasantness," and offer lots of audience-friendly public relations fare.14 This 
dependence on government-supplied fodder makes for a more compliant press corps. In 
Second Front, John MacArthur presented a thorough indictment of American news 
organizations' failure to fight the censorship imposed by the Bush administration. 
According to MacArthur, when the war began "the media were tied up in the knots of 
their own collusion with the government."15 As Robert Entman and Benjamin Page 
noted, "reporting that circulates information and opinion at odds with the administration 
is vital to the possibility of democracy in foreign policy. Such coverage offers the 
potential for the public to assess administration policy critically and to participate in 
genuine policy deliberation."16  
Government can sometimes wield considerable influence in shaping coverage of its 
actions. What it cannot afford to do, however, is underestimate the potential impact of 
live reporting of a war or similar foreign policy event. For both journalism and 
government, speed is important. Policy makers will find themselves at a political 
disadvantage if their efforts lag too far behind the pace set by news coverage. W. Lance 
Bennett has written that "the speed and portability of communications equipment, 
combined with a public fascination for live events coverage, forces officials to make 
calculations based on the daily publicity surrounding their actions. Such calculations 
might result in policies that are hasty, ill-conceived, damaging to future options, or 
tempered by domestic opinion rather than long-term state interests."17  
It was precisely this kind of damage that the Bush administration sought to prevent by 
anticipating news media demands and potential effects on public opinion. The controls 
imposed on journalists during the Gulf War were the products of this anticipation, and 
were effective in achieving the administration's goals. Even the relative spontaneity of 
live coverage is susceptible to government-imposed limitations. In the Gulf War real-time 
reporting presented moments of drama but featured little that could not be anticipated by 
government officials. Therefore it had little impact on the course that Bush administration 
policy makers had carefully set. 
Tiananmen Square 
In Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the students demonstrating in support of 
democratic reform were well aware of their international television audience, and had 
designed part of their strategy to influence American public opinion in particular. They 
waved signs written in English, quoting the likes of Patrick Henry. Their much-
photographed "goddess of liberty" was modeled on the Statue of Liberty.  
These Chinese protests represented the first time that a major breaking story was covered 
without interruption for a worldwide television audience. With the presence of CNN, the 
wire services now had live competition, so they no longer could unilaterally determine 
the pace at which information would be gathered, edited and reported.18 CNN also 
intruded into the wire services' traditional role as the primary source for other news 
organizations. 
The cumulative power of this coverage was particularly noteworthy. Walter Goodman 
wrote about this in the New York Times: "Beginning Saturday night and resuming 
Sunday morning, the networks had been running still photographs and televised scenes 
from China as they came in. This conveyed action, confusion, crisis. What exactly was 
going on was not always clear, but that in a way added to their immediacy. Taken 
together they told a strong story - soldiers, so many soldiers, moving in on the protestors; 
students pounding with sticks on an armored troop carrier; burned-out buses and stranded 
bicycles; the improvised barricades crushed by the military machines; recorded voices of 
witnesses describing beatings of students by the soldiers."19
The real-time policy-making loop was much in evidence in this case. When the Chinese 
government ordered a halt to live television transmissions, President Bush issued his 
formal protest - via CNN - about the events he had been witnessing . . . on CNN.20 Both 
CNN and CBS broadcast their own shutdown being ordered by "official representatives 
of the Chinese Government, embarrassed and clearly aware that they were losing face on 
live television."21 The Chinese government was, however, able to use some of the 
American networks' coverage for its own purposes. When NBC's Tom Brokaw 
interviewed government spokesman Yuan Mu, both NBC and China's state-run television 
carried it live. Yuan denied that government troops had massacred students. As he said 
this, NBC rolled videotape of the Tiananmen violence. On the Chinese broadcast, only 
the picture of Yuan appeared.22 Chinese officials presumably thought their credibility 
with their own people would be enhanced if Yuan was seen being grilled by an 
American. They, of course, had no intention of showing the incriminating pictures from 
the square. 
Responses to the Tiananmen brutality reflected policy makers' recognition that news 
coverage was affecting public opinion worldwide. American response to the crisis would 
be scrutinized in the context of the images from the square that television had delivered. 
Nevertheless, President Bush displayed considerable restraint in his response. He thought 
that "posturing" about human rights would do no good and would prove too costly in the 
long-term relations between the United States and China.23 In terms of long-range 
geopolitical realities, Bush's position may have been sensible. But in the swirl of the 
politics of the moment, his response looked puny and opened him to criticism from those 
who had less direct responsibility for policy-making. Bush was aware of this. In a letter 
to Deng Xiaoping, Bush wrote: "As you know, the clamor for stronger action remains 
intense. I have resisted that clamor, making clear that I did not want to see destroyed this 
relationship that you and I have worked hard to build."24 In his diary, Bush acknowledged 
the source of at least part of the clamor. He wrote: "I want to preserve the relationship, 
but I must also make clear that the U.S. cannot condone this kind of human rights 
brutality. You have the networks, led principally by Dan Rather, pitching everything with 
the highest emotional content and driving to . . . almost break relations with China, and 
that I don't want."25  
Bush clearly felt media-generated pressures as the violence flared. He understood the 
public's reaction to the pictures and words arriving from Tiananmen, but he separated 
immediate political repercussions from longer-term policy commitments. His refusal to 
alter basic policy toward China is evidence that news coverage (real-time or otherwise) 
may be influential but not necessarily determinative.  
Kosovo  
Just as the Gulf War was the first live television war, the 1999 conflict in Kosovo was the 
first Internet war. Although mainstream news organizations have their own Web sites for 
delivering information, the Web dramatically changes the news media's role as 
gatekeeper. Web users can create their own array of sources, moving with a click of the 
mouse from the White House to the Serbian Ministry of Information, taking and 
believing whatever they want from each.  
This is unmediated media: no filter, no editorial judgments, no commentary or context 
beyond what is offered on the screen by the unchallenged source. For some news 
consumers, this may be the intellectual freedom they have long desired: "No network 
anchor is telling us what to think; no editor is chopping out paragraphs that we might find 
interesting. We can gather news just as journalists do and decide for ourselves what to 
make of it." That approach certainly has appeal, but with limited ability to verify 
information picked up at various Web sites, the independent news gatherers are at the 
mercy of their sources. They might find plenty of "news," but discovering the truth amid 
that news can be difficult. 
News organizations facilitate this independence by providing links from their own Web 
sites. CNN, for instance, offered a long list of war-related links, such as ones to the 
Kosovo Liberation Peace Movement, the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook 
(for CIA-compiled information about Serbia and Montenegro), a free-lance journalist's 
site with a road map of Kosovo, refugee agencies and a number of audio and video 
offerings. On its site, Radio Yugoslavia denounced NATO as "the fascists of the new 
world order," while NATO on its site offered video sequences of its recent airstrikes. 
CNN's list of Web links was preceded by a parenthetical note stating, "These sites are not 
endorsed by CNN Interactive." But for Web users moving from the principal site along 
the path of links, there might be no real sense of leaving the news organization's 
premises. The news organization faces the dilemma of providing access to other sites 
without implying approval or vouching for the accuracy of the linked sites.  
In the world of cybernews, lines between fact and propaganda may blur. Journalists have 
new competition from the many voices the Internet amplifies. Similarly, government 
officials who explain policy must vie for attention with those using the Web as electronic 
soapbox. The Internet will educate with unpredictable effect. As online news coverage 
expands, the "CNN effect" becomes old hat; the Web has moved beyond all-news 
television because of the almost infinite variety of primary sites and related links it can 
feature. With their own sites, governments gain direct instant access to worldwide 
publics, giving policy makers more control in terms of shaping public opinion.  
The 1999 fighting in the Balkans marked the arrival of online news as a force in 
covering, and thus in making, foreign policy. Coverage of the war in Kosovo also 
underscored the continuing significance of television's pictures as a factor in shaping 
public opinion. As was the case with the Iraqi Kurds nearly a decade before, the emotion-
laden coverage of Kosovar refugees affected public perceptions of the conflict. As 
television reports increased in number and in their graphic content, opinion polls 
indicated a rise in support for the Clinton administration's and NATO's air war and their 
stated determination to enable the refugees to return home. William Shawcross wrote: 
"The appalling television images of vast armies of refugees being forced at gunpoint 
across European borders - crucial now as always to Western demands that 'something 
must be done' - meant that Western opinion coalesced around NATO. But it could be 
fickle."26 That fickleness requires watchfulness on the part of policy makers. If the 
pictures change or vanish, opinion might go with them. Also, there was in Kosovo as in 
other humanitarian crises a compassionate but simplistic veneer that became attached to 
policy. As Bernard Cohen has noted, "The human costs of war are eminently pictorial; 
the political imperatives and advantages are not."27  
CONCLUSIONS  
The effects of news coverage on foreign policy will vary according to the firmness or 
softness of the policy-making process. A solid, principled policy foundation is less likely 
to be shaken by news reports and resultant public demands that "Something must be 
done!" 
Peter Jennings of ABC News has observed that "political leadership trumps good 
television every time. As influential as television can be, it is most influential in the 
absence of decisive political leadership."28 Nevertheless, policy makers should brace 
themselves for a surge of emotion-driven public opinion in the wake of graphic news 
coverage of events such as war or other humanitarian disaster. This is especially true 
when the coverage is live, because these reports carry an additional drama of their own. 
Policy makers also should recognize that journalists are not infallible, and that their 
reports - no matter how well supported with convincing video - sometimes may be 
incomplete, lack nuance or simply be wrong.  
For their part, news organizations should be sensitive to governments' reliance on their 
coverage when it serves as messenger, early warning system and general gatherer of 
information about goings on elsewhere. This reliance should lead to renewed 
commitment to thoroughness and accuracy on the part of those who deliver the news. As 
a corollary to this, journalists who present live reports should beware of being 
manipulated by those who want to affect policy via the news media. With so much 
emphasis on speed, the temptation may arise to shortchange corroboration of sources and 
other fact-checking procedures. That will inevitably lead to errors. News organizations 
also should develop plans for self-censorship when live coverage could compromise 
military security, improperly intrude on privacy (as in the case of live reports and pictures 
of casualties) or otherwise disrupt an essential governmental function. If journalists do 
not police themselves, governments will do it for them. This does not, however, mean 
that news organizations should willingly accede to governmental interference in 
legitimate news gathering and reporting. Regardless of policy-making issues, the public, 
not the government, remains the news media's primary client.  
When considering the effects of news coverage on policy, it is important to remember 
that policy also affects coverage. Writing about the American decision to intervene in 
Somalia in 1992, Jonathan Mermin noted that this policy "is not at heart evidence of the 
power of television to move governments; it is evidence of the power of governments to 
move television."29 Leaders in Congress and other supporters of the Somalia intervention 
had taken the lead, and news coverage followed. Much the same pattern could be seen in 
Kosovo in 1999. Coverage reinforced, but did not bring about, the Clinton 
administration's interventionist policy.  
Riding the ups and downs of media-inspired public opinion can be harrowing for even 
resolute policy makers. News coverage of foreign affairs often fails to establish context; 
episodic reporting may exclude a sense of the larger picture and long-term policy goals.30 
This version of reality - often as dramatic as it is imprecise - may be accepted by a public 
whose attention span is brief, but if those who govern are unprepared for this, it can 
wreak havoc with the consistency that should be part of sound policy-making.  
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